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If a human being loses his political status, he should, 
according to the implications of the inborn and 
inalienable rights of man, come under exactly the 
situation for which the declarations of such general 
rights provided. Actually the opposite is the case. It 
seems that a man who is nothing but a man has lost the 
very qualities which make it possible for other people to 
treat him as a fellow-man.  
Hannah Arendt (1966, 300) 
 
Regional integration promised to open up borders, expand the 
mobility of persons and resources, institutionalize 
multilateral cooperation fostering security and prosperity, 
and multiply arenas of belonging, encouraging more inclusive 
collective identities. In the North American case that promise 
has rung increasingly hollow. Unequal relationships between 
states were built into regional agreements and the priority of 
national interests, especially security, often confounds 
cooperation leading to harsh attempts to re-solidify borders. 
In consequence, large groups remain excluded, are becoming 
progressively marginalized, or find themselves caught in a web 
of tensions created by the confrontation between transnational 
forces and reassertions of local or national sovereignty. 
Extricating such groups before they fall through the gaps is 
proving to be extremely difficult for national and 
transnational institutions. This is exacerbated by the 
exclusionary policies actively pursued by some national and 
subnational governments in their efforts to resist the 
incursions on their sovereignty brought by deterritorial-
ization and global restructuring.  
 
A growing literature has highlighted the institutional 
failures that contribute to such exclusions and continue to 
obstruct regional cooperation and its inclusive ideals of free 
movement across boundaries and equal access to resources and 
rights (see Ayres and MacDonald 2006; Studer and Wise (eds.) 
2007; Gabriel and MacDonald 2007; Genna and Mayer-Foulkes 
(eds.) 2011; Kapling and Nossal 2009; Van Nijnatten 2007; 
Luccisano 2007). The conceptual confusions underpinning many 
of those failures are not a strong focus in the literature, 
however, particularly from the perspective of political 
philosophy. This is, in part, because the deep connections 
between the concepts of state, nation, citizen, human rights, 
and sovereignty make it challenging to discuss one in any 
depth without implicating all. It is nevertheless a challenge 
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worth accepting if an appropriate starting point can be found. 
In this respect, Hannah Arendt’s critique of human rights and 
the notion of superfluousness emerging from it are invaluable 
for the additional light they shed on the exclusionary 
dimensions of immigration laws in North America. I argue that 
the clash between globalizing forces on one hand, and a 
reassertion of state sovereignty on the other, provides the 
conditions for systematic exclusions from the protections that 
human rights should deliver. In doing so, I consider some of 
the ways the paradox of rights Arendt theorized in the 1960s 
continues to beleaguer human rights today. 
 
I first outline the conceptual confusions Arendt identified at 
the foundation of a deep rivalry between citizenship rights 
and human rights, a rivalry that lies at the heart of debates 
over the Arizona Immigration Law and similar legislation. I 
then sketch Arendt’s notion of superfluousness before 
suggesting that several elements of her account appear in new 
and alarming form in recent U.S. immigration policy. 
Elsewhere, I have explored in detail Arendt’s theoretical 
arguments on rights, superfluousness and the state as well as 
its potential application to several issues in contemporary 
politics (Norman 2009, 2011, 2012). To minimize covering the 
same ground, the following synopsis isolates the main points 
pertaining to immigration control issues. 
 
The Paradox of Rights 
 
In Arendt’s view, the whole idea of grounding rights in a 
notion of humanity contains a paradox at its base that at 
certain historical junctures—for her in the aftermath of WWI 
and in totalitarian regimes, but also now in times of 
globalization—can make upholding human rights extremely 
challenging even when the political will to do so is very 
strong. To function as a protective safety net against 
government mistreatment or negligence, the Rights of Man were 
designed in a way that tied them to humanity: to people, not 
governments or states. It was thought that only this could 
render them truly “inalienable”: irreducible to other rights 
and laws. “It is by no means certain,” she argued, “whether 
this is possible” since the functioning of any rights system 
is predicated on the legal system, which requires the state 
system (Arendt 1966, 298). A catch-22 ensues: human rights are 
supposed to activate when the state fails in its duties to 
some or all of its people(s), but they simultaneously require 
the state system to be guaranteed and claimed. Human rights 
therefore do not undercut the sovereign state. They are 
altogether reliant on it. In consequence, although other 
states or international organizations can intervene on behalf 
of those whose human rights have been violated, the success of 
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humanitarian intervention—and the system of human rights 
itself—has to contend with the continuing fact of state 
sovereignty (298).  
 
For Arendt, the people affected most negatively by the paradox 
of rights were those made stateless almost overnight when the 
boundaries of Europe were redrawn after World War I. In the 
face of millions of refugees, the legal process of 
naturalization broke down internationally. Arendt’s worry was 
that being stateless does not just deprive a person of 
belonging to a territory. It deprives them of occupying a 
clear “niche in the framework of the general law” (Arendt 
1966, 283, citing Jermings 1939) the basis of which rests not 
on human rights, but on citizenship status and the political 
rights that accompany it. A fundamental conceptual confusion 
between homme and citoyen thus permeated the 1789 Declaration 
at its inception (Agamben 1998, 126), and was replicated in a 
similar confusion over the relation between the individual and 
the state in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR). Article 15’s lack of a clear definition of the right 
to citizenship and its relation to the right to nationality 
(Harrington 2009) clouds the conceptual picture further. It 
might make intuitive sense to consider the biological status 
and needs of humans as more fundamental than other statuses 
and privileges, including political ones. Yet if the 
protection of these needs is expressed in the form of rights, 
it is predicated on the prior existence of a functional legal 
and political artifice, not the other way around. Logically 
speaking, then, the exclusive concept of the citizen precedes 
and is necessary for articulating the inclusive concept of 
‘the human.’ And, contrary to the reverse derivation in 
Enlightenment social contract theories, the state precedes and 
is necessary for conceiving—and protecting—‘the individual.’ 
 
Arendt’s work on totalitarianism stresses the grave practical 
consequences involved in placing human rights prior to 
political rights and the ensuing problems with conflating 
citizenship, nationality and humanity or basing conflicting 
conceptions of rights on any or all of these. In becoming 
stateless, she argued, persons are deprived of the only entity 
that could guarantee a set of minimum rights (Arendt 1966, 
291-2), rendering them vulnerable to abuse, since they have no 
functional legal status in their own countries or abroad. The 
state has the last word on who has legal status to be 
protected, and whose rights will be suspended or 
deprioritized. Unable to send refugees back to their 
nonexistent homelands and unwilling to assimilate them into 
their own sovereign nations, after WWI the idea of internment 
camps for large groups of ‘the unwanted’ became (and in many 
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places still is1) the “routine solution” along with a 
temptation to resort to excessive policing and arbitrary rule 
(287-8). 
  
Human Superfluousness 
 
Arendt’s concept of human superfluousness is rooted in the 
inherent confusions of the paradox of rights and is a notion 
that remains highly pertinent today, though new contexts are 
generating it in diverse ways. The predicament of the 
stateless “is not that they are not equal before the law, but 
that no law exists for them” (Arendt 1966, 295-6). The absence 
of occupying a defined niche in the legal system means that 
the stateless are deprived of the most fundamental right of 
all: “the right to have rights” (296). Without it, human 
rights cease to function and the stateless are all but 
condemned to fall through a glaring crack in the legal system 
to the point where they are rendered superfluous—and treated 
accordingly. This may sound like a radical claim based on an 
equally radical and highly specific set of historical 
examples, yet its implications are profound and hold much 
contemporary significance when reflecting on the exclusionary 
features of recent immigration policy trends.  
 
The stateless have no state to guarantee their human rights or 
to make claims against those who might violate them. They are 
consequently deprived of many basic things legally, 
politically and often socially: a place in the legal 
framework, a place in the world to belong to and call home, a 
state to claim human rights on their behalf, even their 
individuality and specific group identity is in danger of 
becoming blurred. They consequently vanish from our familiar 
juridico-socio-political map, slipping through the fissures 
between institutions, anomalies that no longer fit the ethico-
legal-political framework the state system provides. If such 
groups cannot be assimilated, Arendt claimed, it is easier to 
view them as undeserving of the same kind of political 
attention and status that citizens enjoy, or even see them as 
threatening. The very existence of anomalous groups challenges 
the legal-political framework which, in Arendt’s time, was 
already destabilized by the effects of WWI on the territories 
of Europe and sovereign authority of the defeated nations. In 
the interwar period, European states responded by soundly re-
                                                 
1 Administrative detention of refugees and asylum seekers is widespread in 
Europe and the U.S. in restrictive detention centers and frequently in 
prisons. For example, from 2001-2008 the Australian government shipped 
asylum seekers to offshore camps on Nauru and Manus Islands, Papua New 
Guinea. Both were shut in 2008, but the Christmas Island detention center 
remains to deal with Australia’s policy of mandatory detention for 
unauthorized aliens.  
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exerting their authority over the stateless. In a context 
where globalization is producing a concomitant challenge to 
the solidity and permanence of territorial boundaries and thus 
to state sovereignty, it is not difficult to see the Arizona 
Immigration Law or recent nationalist rhetoric in Europe (see 
Friedman 2010; Kuenssberg 2011) as clear responses to 
precisely the perceived ‘threat’ Arendt highlighted. 
 
On Arendt’s account, when groups are not claimed by a 
sovereign authority able or willing to enforce the protection 
of their rights, this can escalate to the point where they 
“are treated as if they no longer existed, as if what happened 
to them were no longer of any interest to anybody, as if they 
were already dead” (Arendt 1966, 445). And so she claims there 
was a certain logic to the progression from interment camps 
for stateless people in the interwar period to “perfect” or 
complete superfluousness (295-6). Arendt was referring to the 
dehumanization tactics that produced the ‘living dead’ of the 
Nazi annihilation camps where once-human individuals were 
turned into unremembered, replaceable nonpersons, 
indistinguishable from each other, and stripped of any 
solidarity. This unclaimed, unwanted, “superfluous human 
materiel” (443) was condemned to be shunted between 
authorities from one place to another, and ultimately 
liquidated if conditions were thought to require it. 
Nevertheless, the pertinence of many of her claims is not 
restricted to such extreme cases, or to the experiences of 
statelessness as these are traditionally understood—
particularly in an increasingly deterritorialized world.  
 
State Sovereignty, Superfluousness and Immigration in North 
America 
 
The deterritorialization that accompanies globalization is 
impacting the ways the paradox of human rights can lead to 
contemporary variants of superfluousness that apply to more 
than those who have no state to return to. In North America 
since NAFTA, several reactions to the increased mobility of 
persons and resources (and violence and contraband) across 
porous borders and the decreasing control the three states 
have been able to exert over their denizens and territory 
reflect a desire to both resist deep integration at the 
political- and regional-identity level and reassert a 
traditional view of state sovereignty more consonant with the 
idea of territorialized, nationally based citizenship rights 
than it is with human rights. This is evident in recent U.S. 
and Canadian reassertions of authority concerning their right—
recognized in international law—to determine who should be 
granted citizen status with the legal protection that goes 
with it and who should not. “It is in this respect that 
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immigration has become central to the exercise of state 
sovereignty” (Gabriel and MacDonald 2007, 271) It has also 
become a site that is primed for the systematic generation of 
superfluousness that is proving difficult to counter at the 
institutional level for the very reasons Arendt identified. 
 
The range and flexibility of labor, mobility and attendant 
expanded citizen rights built into European integration at its 
base was, and is, simply not present in the North American 
model. Inclusion is far from equal across the three states. 
For example, NAFTA’s Chapter 16 permits temporary free 
mobility and labor rights across the region to a narrow group 
of skilled workers, traders or investors. There is no cap on 
the number of Canadians who can enter the U.S. under this 
visa. “For Mexicans, a limit was set at 5,500 initial 
approvals per year for a transition period of ten years (until 
2004)” (Trade Compliance Center 2012). 
 
Two further examples of the clampdown on mobility rights and 
privileges in the region brace the legal inequality. In the 
U.S., the June 2009 Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative made 
it mandatory for U.S. citizens (re-)entering the U.S. by land 
or sea to present a passport, passport card, Enhanced Driving 
License or Trusted Traveler Card. This has greatly affected 
many Mexican-Americans wishing to visit their families in 
Mexico, deposit remittances there or engage in other 
socioeconomic transactions. Canada followed suit a month 
later, backpedalling on its originally lenient immigration 
laws in response to a reported almost threefold rise in 
Mexican refugee claims since 2005. Immigration Minister Jason 
Kenney announced that, “In addition to creating significant 
delays and spiraling new costs in our refugee program, the 
sheer volume of these claims is undermining our ability to 
help people fleeing real persecution” (Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada 2009). A Temporary Residence visa is now 
required for all Mexicans entering the country. 
 
The temporary visa effectively tightened the 2004 Canada-U.S. 
Safe Third Country Agreement controls on those attempting to 
claim refugee status at the Canadian border, essentially 
closing it to the vast majority of Mexican refugee claimants 
if they had already passed through a “safe” country (the U.S.) 
in which they could claim asylum from persecution, or a well-
founded fear of it, at home. This agreement’s institutional 
expression of shared bilateral responsibility over what to do 
about the influx of immigrants and refugees, and where to 
shunt them next, is only superficially promising, for the 
question of—and protection of—state sovereignty overshadows 
that of human rights here. It is manifestly problematic for 
Mexican refugee applicants to both countries. Their home state 
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might be willing to to receive them, but it is in many cases 
unable to fully ‘claim’ them by guaranteeing their human 
rights in the face of overwhelming narcoviolence and 
institutionalized corruption. Tougher Canadian border controls 
have also contributed to the heightened perception of ‘threat’ 
that ‘the unwanted’ are generating in the United States. If no 
country in the region is prepared to fully claim the 
‘unwanted,’ certain forms of superfluousness ensue despite the 
best efforts of nonstate human rights actors. 
 
The current reassertion of state sovereignty has focused on 
stiffening control through the abundance of proposals and 
funding for more policing of North American borders (see 
Gunkel and González Wahl 2012). In the U.S., former anti-drug 
and immigration-crossing measures have been adapted to the 
drives of the war on terror, cementing the now-pervasive 
connection between immigration policy and security concerns. 
This is most symbolically expressed in the blatant effort to 
re-solidify territorial borders quite literally via the U.S.-
Mexico border wall, 649 miles of which had been constructed in 
August 2011 (U.S. GAO 2011, 38). The combination of attempts 
by the undocumented to avoid falling foul of drug gang 
presence on one side, or greatly augmented patrols and new 
technologies on the other, seriously heightens the risk of 
death in the most inhospitable parts of the desert or in the 
sea around the coastal border area. The cumulative effect has 
been less of a deterrent to illegal crossing than it has been 
to actively force the use of the most perilous of routes. The 
connection of the basic objective of this policy to the logic 
of superfluousness is clear: one way or another, far fewer 
illegal immigrants should enter. Regarding the many shocking 
tales of deaths involved in crossing the Mexican-U.S. 
frontier, one remark from a retired U.S. Border Patrol sector 
chief is revealing of how superfluousness is generated today. 
“The strategy is a failure. All it’s accomplished is killing 
people… But since these people are Mexicans, no one seems to 
care” (Gunkel and González Wahl 2012, 39, citing Moser 2003). 
The trails to the remaining gaps in the wall also channel the 
surviving undocumented migrants into certain areas en masse. 
 
The 2010 Arizona Immigration Law (SB1070) and related 
legislation in other U.S. states have complemented this with a 
reassertion of the authoritative value of citizenship rights 
over the illegal immigrant community, coupled with giving 
heightened powers to state police—one symptom that Arendt 
correlated with the production of superfluousness in interwar 
Europe. “Theoretically,” she wrote, “in the sphere of 
international law, it had always been true that sovereignty is 
nowhere more absolute than in matters of emigration, 
naturalization, nationality and expulsion” (Arendt 1966, 278). 
Emma R. Norman        
 
 8
This led her to muse on such “weapon[s] of denaturalization” 
(279), again emphasizing the strong contemporary connection 
between security and immigration issues. 
 
Illegal immigrants are not stateless in the sense Arendt 
discussed. They generally belong to an existing state to which 
they can be deported and, in the case of the 11 million 
Mexican illegal immigrants the recent U.S. laws have targeted, 
that state does not prohibit their return. However, the 
difficulties the Mexican government is experiencing in its 
ability and willingness to guarantee the observation of their 
human rights at home is not offering substantial incentives 
for the deported to remain in Mexico, or for those 
contemplating emigration because their basic needs are not 
being met. In the absence of such incentives, deterrents 
abroad are escalating in response. Recent U.S. legislative 
reactions to illegal immigration exemplify the ongoing rivalry 
between citizenship and human rights while also reflecting new 
forms of superfluousness that, despite their lower-grade 
character, remain insidious. 
 
It is well known that SB1070, which criminalizes being in the 
state without applying for and carrying valid documentation, 
has perturbing implications for human rights by increasing the 
likelihood of arbitrary arrest and detention and promoting 
discrimination on the basis of racial appearance. It is in 
danger of contravening Article 9 of the UDHR concerning 
arbitrary arrest, detention and exile and also could 
transgress international law’s stipulation that detention is 
“‘a measure of last resort’... deemed appropriate only when 
states can demonstrate that it is ‘necessary and 
proportionate’ to the objective being achieved” (Gunkel and 
González Wahl 2012, 40). It likewise risks not just blurring 
the distinction between civil and criminal law, but dispensing 
with it (39). The human rights of the most vulnerable—notably 
asylum seekers, human trafficking victims and women—are hit 
the hardest. Such cases also flag the institutional failures 
that spring from such control measures in the conflict between 
U.S. state immigration legislation and the prior responses 
that human rights institutions have established to protect the 
most susceptible. 
 
SB1070 is unclear on what documents constitute valid proof of 
lawful presence in pending petitions for asylum. The broad 
latitude and lack of instructions to enforcement officials 
could result in the “unjustified detention of individuals who 
have initiated the process to legalize their status in the 
U.S… [which] contravenes Article 31 of the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, as modified by the 1967 
Protocol” (Mayer et al. 2010, 31). A similar lack of clarity 
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applies to escaped victims of human trafficking. “By 
criminalizing the failure to produce this proof, the Act 
punishes the victims instead of the traffickers” while 
jeopardizing the effectiveness of the T and U visa programs 
the federal government offers to protect trafficking victims 
(31). Women are also less likely to report crimes to police 
(notably violent crimes and domestic abuse) if this would 
require them to produce documentation or lead to possible 
detention, criminal prosecution and deportation. This 
conflicts with the waiver furnished by the prior federal 
Immigration and Nationality Act intended to protect victims of 
domestic violence who enter the country illegally (31). 
 
The conflict here between state interests, federal law 
provisions and international legal obligations is patent. So 
too is the conflict between citizenship rights and human 
rights, especially when prioritizing the former is used 
(bio)politically as an expression of state sovereignty 
(Agamben 1998). Such institutional failures don’t necessarily 
imply the existence of a total legal void. Federal and 
international provisions are there. Illegal immigrants are not 
the ‘forgotten’ stateless, for whom there exists no juridical 
niche whatsoever. But undocumented persons are still ‘the 
unwanted,’ ‘the outlawed,’ and in many respects ‘the 
unclaimed.’ In Arizona and Alabama, federal and international 
laws created for their protection in precisely these cases are 
trumped by state laws created against them, making it more 
difficult for human rights institutions to extricate them from 
their position caught in the middle. 
 
Part of the reason lies in the low level of cooperation 
between (and within) the North American states in resolving 
migration issues in the region which obstructs institutional 
success in “claiming” immigrants or rights on their behalf. 
The contrast with how European states reinforce regional 
accountability and conflicting national and regional policies 
is striking. When France expelled over 1,000 Roma in August 
2010, for example, the instant widespread outcry led to the 
September 9th European Parliament Resolution calling for the 
immediate suspension of all deportations of the Roma. The 
European Commission launched infringement proceedings, setting 
a two-week deadline for the French government to cease 
violations of the 2004 European Directive on Freedom of 
Movement and the regional ban on ethnic discrimination in the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights. France complied.2 
                                                 
2 But only after claiming that the expulsions were based on questions of 
national security, not ethnicity (see Mayer et al. 2010, 36), paralleling 
similar defenses in the February 7, 2012 Arizona brief to the Supreme Court 
(see Winograd 2012). 
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Recalling the opening quotation from Arendt, in this case at 
least, the regional government, the publics of member states 
and human rights organizations cooperated to “claim” the Roma 
as “fellow” Europeans—if not Arendt’s “fellow men”—and their 
rights in a way that is proving far more difficult for 
institutions on the other side of the Atlantic. 
 
The absence of a regional political identity and status in 
North America certainly indicates that it is harder to treat 
undocumented migrants as “fellow men” and women, and easier to 
treat them as superfluous nonpersons excluded from human 
solidarity. The policy of self-deportation, or attrition-
through-enforcement, that has occupied recent debates in the 
run-up to the U.S. presidential election reinforces this. The 
strategy deliberately aims to render everyday life so wretched 
for unauthorized immigrants that they choose to go home 
regardless of how immersed they are in the community, as well 
as being a deterrent to those contemplating unlawful entry. 
Intentionally creating not just discomfort but misery lies at 
the base of the new Alabama law, which has already stimulated 
much fear and fleeing.  
 
Unauthorized parents took their kids out of school, they 
refuse to seek medical services, fear going to church, 
they don’t drive anywhere, their access to water service 
has been threatened. Some employers have refused to pay 
their workers, judges and court interpreters threatened to 
report suspected unauthorized immigrants. (Waslin 2012) 
 
This policy of making life unbearable for illegal aliens is 
being packaged as a “kinder, gentler alternative to the harsh, 
expensive, and unworkable strategy of mass deportation” 
(Waslin 2012). An Arendtian reading belies this. The 
undocumented are seen as undeserving not merely of the same 
kind of political attention citizens enjoy, but of basic 
social needs and human consideration. In Arizona deportations 
have skyrocketed under Obama’s presidency (Winograd 2012) and 
the projected increase of now-legal arrests and incarcerations 
exhibits disturbing parallels with Arendt’s claim that “the 
interment camp…has become the routine solution for the problem 
of domicile of the ‘displaced persons’” (Arendt 1966, 279). 
Administrative detainees are often jailed in the same spaces 
as convicted criminals, are similarly attired and restrained, 
and subject to the same risks of physical harm even though 
international law stipulates they should be separated for this 
reason (see Gunkel and González Wahl 2012, 40). 
 
The fact that SB1070 has spurred cognate legislation in other 
states reinforces the gravity of Arendt’s observation that, in 
the absence of political rights, the effective power of human 
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rights evaporates at the very moment they are needed the most. 
In the European case, transnational citizenship status has 
been employed as one way around this problem: regional 
political rights can be used as partial anchors for human 
rights and transnational solidarity if national political 
rights are withheld. However, the contemporary consensus is 
that too many differences exist between Europe and North 
America in the conditions and objectives of integration to 
contemplate the possibility of a shared regional citizenship 
in the latter case any time soon. Even if it were possible in 
the future, Arendt’s paradox of rights is still likely to 
apply (see Norman 2012). If political status disappears, 
“human” status and solidarity apparently disappear with it. 
Bills proposed in the 2012 session in Missouri, Mississippi, 
Tennessee and Virginia suggest this disappearance will 
continue in North America, despite probable Supreme Court 
blocks of some of their more extreme tenets. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Several elements of globalization have meant superfluousness 
is no longer a condition restricted to the stateless, and 
capitalized on by totalitarian regimes in death camp 
scenarios. It is one tactic that can be utilized by otherwise 
democratic regimes in their attempts to reconcile the 
sovereignty requirements of the modern state system with 
globalized conditions of migration, economic and political 
interdependence, conflicting regional, national and local 
interests, international legal obligations and sanctions, and 
technological advances. The point to add here is that weak 
regional cooperation, self-interested unilateral or 
subnational problem solving, and radically unequal national 
status provide many conditions for the systematic 
proliferation of new forms of superfluousness. The forms being 
generated today are, for the most part, less extreme than 
those in Arendt’s arguments. Yet this does little to detract 
from their insidious character or potential spread. 
 
The quote from Arendt at the beginning of section one begs the 
question: what can encourage us to “treat a (hu)man” like a 
“fellow (hu)man”? This is one of the basic enquiries 
underpinning the kind of multilateral cooperation and regional 
integration that penetrates deeper than the mere optimization 
of national economic interests on the world stage. The present 
argument provides no positive answers. But it does indicate 
that a satisfactory response is unlikely to be found in human 
rights alone, however tenaciously they are fought for. Valuing 
and institutionalizing a regional respect for their equal 
application, and a political space to express it, is as 
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crucial as providing functional institutional state and 
nonstate human rights enforcement. Insofar as Arendt’s paradox 
of rights remains unresolved and the reassertion of state 
sovereignty continues in its present forms, it is doubtful 
that nonstate actors will be fully successful in stretching 
far enough across the fissures in the legal safety net that 
the rivalry between human rights and citizen rights create—
fissures toward which so many illegal immigrants are now being 
deliberately herded. 
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